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CASE COMMENTS
SECURITIES REGULATION - CLASS ACTIONS - COMMON QUESTIONS OF
MISREPRESENTATION PREDOMINATE OVER INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS OF RELIANCE
-PuNrIvE DAMAGES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER THE SECURITIES EX-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934.-The Wolf Corporation [Wolf] was organized in
January, 1961 as a consolidation of various real estate limited partnerships
syndicated by their general partners. In February, 1961, Wolf filed a registra-
tion statement and its first prospectus with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. These covered Wolf's Class A common stock and its subordinated de-
bentures, and became effective on June 2, 1961. Under this registration state-
ment Wolf sold 60,000 shares of Class A common stock to the public at a price
of $10 per share, and offered 746,350 common shares plus $2,808,000 of its
debentures to the limited partners of the syndicated partnerships. In January
of 1962, Wolf filed a second registration statement and prospectus which covered
an additional issue of the corporation's Class A common stock and its sub-
ordinated debentures. Six months later Wolf amended its second registration
statement to cover a different combination of securities and a third prospectus
was prepared accordingly. The SEC began an investigation of Wolf in July,
1962. On September 24 of that year, the SEC instituted stop-order proceedings
against Wolf's second registration statement on the ground that it contained
allegedly untruthful statements, including inaccuracies in the amount of cash
Wolf claimed was available for distribution to stockholders. In a decision dated
May 4, 1966, the SEC found that Wolf's second registration statement was
materially misleading. However, the SEC accepted Wolf's offer to withdraw
the second registration statement and the second and third prospectuses upon
the condition that all stockholders, and all other persons who received preliminary
prospectuses, would be advised of the SEC's proceeding.' Because of the SEC
stop-order action and Wolf's withdrawal in settlement, no securities were sold
pursuant to the second registration statement.
2
Leon Green purchased 100 shares of Wolf stock in the open market at
$10.25 a share on June 13, 1962, shortly after the third prospectus was issued.8
Green brought an action against Wolf4 pursuant to section 10b of the Securities
I A strong consideration behind the SEC's decision to consent to Wolf's offer of settle-
ment was the fact that shareholders and all public investors would "have available to them
the dismal record of the abortive financial program and the deceptive financial presentation
of the registrant's [Wolf] earlier record of operations ... " Brief for Appellant at 9, Green
v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
2 Even though no stock was sold pursuant to the second and third prospectuses, the
complaint alleged that the dissemination of all prospectuses in the financial community caused
a subsequent inflation in Wolf securities. Brief for Appellees at 5, Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291 (2d Oh'. 1968).
3 Prior to June, 1961, Green had purchased for $3,500 an interest in one of the limited
partnerships which was consolidated into Wolf. According to the exchange offer covered by
the first registration statement, Green exchanged this interest in the limited partnership for
350 shares of Wolf's Class A common stock and $777 in company bonds. However, these
securities were not the basis of the action. Brief for Appellant at 5, Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
4 In addition to Wolf Corporation, the other defendants named were Joseph Wolf, Joseph
Eckhaus, and Leon Spilky (the controlling directors, officers and stockholders of Wolf
Corporation); David Berdon & Co. (the public accounting firm which certified various financial
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Exchange Act of 1934' and rule 10b-5,' on behalf of himself and all others who
had purchased common stock or subordinated debentures of Wolf between June
2, 1961 and the end of 1963. He claimed that the item "Cash Available for
Distribution to Shareholders" in the balance sheet incorporated in each pros-
pectus was overstated and tended to artificially inflate the price of Wolf stock.
Green alleged that he and the other members of his class relied on this mis-
representation in purchasing their securities. He sought to recover for the class
the difference between the price paid and the unmanipulated value of Wolf
stock,' plus possible punitive damages. In the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, Judge Ryan ordered those portions of the
complaint which asserted Green was maintaining the suit as a class action and
those which sought punitive damages to be stricken from the pleadings. On
appeal from that order, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held: individual questions of reliance do not predominate over common
questions of misrepresentations and therefore a class action could be maintained,
but section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits the re-
covery of punitive damages. Green v. Wolf Corporation, 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.
1968)Y.
The effectiveness of civil remedies for defrauded investors is largely de-
pendent upon the availability of the class action device.s The class action is
essentially a creature of necessity which, ,in allowing one or more members of
a class to bring an action on behalf of the entire class, serves the important
statements contained in the three prospectuses); and Troster, Singer & Co. (the broker-
dealer who was the underwriter with respect to the corporation's second registration state-
ment). These other defendants were charged with controlling and/or aiding and abetting
Wolf Corporation in artificially and falsely inflating -the market price of the corporation's
securities. Id. at 7.
5 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§'78j (1964), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange--.
(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection
with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national securities exchange,
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
. (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
6 SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to onit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
7 Green claimed the unmanipulated value of Wolf Class A common was between 1 and
2V. This was the price range of the stock from the end of 1963 until November, 1967 when
the defendants moved that the class action and punitive damages allegation be struck from
the complaint. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 1968).
8 3 L. Loss, SEcuRnTss REGULATION 1819 (2d ed. 1961).
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function of providing claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims
that would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation.' This function
is dearly served when the investor utilizes the class action device in claiming
injury for a violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws."0
Continued expansion of implied civil remedies under the securities laws'1
increases the importance and use of the class action.
The class action is not new to securities fraud suits' or even to actions
pursuant to rule 10b-5." While the federal courts in the past have tended to
be overly restrictive in applying the class action rule,'4 a trend of liberality in
interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is clearly evident in two recent
court of appeals decisions. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin," the Second Circuit
conditionally permitted the maintenance of a class action where the class num-
bered 3,750,000 persons, but was represented by only one person who claimed a
mere $70 damage. The Eisen court refused to follow past cases decided under the
old Rule 23 which had relied on quantitative elements in determining adequacy
of representation. It recognized that the usefulness of the class action procedure
would be greatly curtailed unless a liberal interpretation was given to Rule 23.6
More germane to the securities fraud situation was the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Esplin v. Hirschi." In an action pursuant to section l0b of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5, and the 1940 Investment Act, the court
of appeals expressed the guiding principle that when class actions are viewed in
the context of securities laws, "the interests of justice require that in a doubtful
case . . . any error . . . should be committed in favor of allowing the class
action."'"
In line with the general thought of these opinions, Green v. Wolf Corpora-
tion19 continued the trend of liberal interpretation of Rule 23 by delineating the
broad scope of authority which the district court can and must exercise to insure
flexible management of a class action in a l0b-5 suit.'0 Before the Second Circuit
9 Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cmi. L. Rev.
684, 714 (1941).
10 As stated in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968): "There can be
little doubt that an action on behalf of a group of defrauded securities purchasers presents a
particularly appropriate reason for a class action." Id. at 488. See also Comment, Adequate
Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by
the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 889, 890 (1968).
11 See generally 2 Loss, supra note 8, at 932-42. The first case to establish civil liability
under rule lOb-5 was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). For
a collection of the cases which have adopted the Kardon doctrine, see Note, Measurement of
Damages in Private Actions under Rule lOb-5, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 165 n.2.
12 See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965); Oppenheimer
v. F.J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944).
13 See, e.g., Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968) (new
Rule 23); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (old Rule 23).
14 Note, Class Action Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule 23,
36 GE O. WASH. L. RV. 1150, 1168 (1968).
15 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
16 Id. at 563. The flexibility of Rule 23's notice provisions is analyzed in an interesting
comment on Eisen in 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 151 (1968).
17 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3355 (U.S. March 24, 1969).
18 Id. at 101.
19 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
20 The striking of the class action allegation from Green's complaint was immediately
appealable because for all practical considerations that would terminate the suit. In Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967), an
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would endorse the maintenance of a class action, all four of the prerequisites of
Rule 23 (a) had to be satisfied plus one of the three conditions listed in Rule
23(b).2 Both Rule 23(a) (1) and Rule 23(a) (4) were easily fulfilled. There
were over 2,000 members in the class represented by Green, so the joinder of
all would be impracticable according to 23 (a) (1) .22 Also, the lack of any con-
flict of interest between Green and the other members of the class, along with
the exhibited competence of Green's counsel, met the standards of 23 (a) (4).2
Satisfying the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) (3), requiring that Green's claims be
typical of the claims of the class, and Rule 23(a) (2), requiring the presence
of questions of law or fact common to the class, presented more difficulty. How-
ever, the presence of these difficulties provided the occasion for the Second
Circuit to illustrate the flexibility inherent in Rule 23.
Although some of the class had acquired their securities in 1961 under the
first prospectus, Green did not purchase his shares of Wolf stock until after the
third prospectus had been issued in June of 1962. This raised the logical con-
tention that Green's claim may have been based on different elements of mis-
representation than some of the claims of the other class members. Yet this
possible defect, standing alone, would not bar Green's class action because Rule
order dismissing a class action was considered "final" within the practical rather than technical
construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which provides that courts of appeals have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts. Id. at 120. The costly and complex
litigation required in a 10b-5 action would prohibit Green from continuing his action for the
recovery of an individual claim of less than $1,000.
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides in part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, "(3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
"(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or cor-
responding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
of a class action.
22 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968).
23 The two primary ingredients that enable one to be termed an adequate representative
of a class were listed by judge Medina in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d
Cir. 1968), as (1) representation by a qualified attorney, and (2) complete absence of any
interests antagonistic to those of the absent members of the class. Id. at 562.
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23(c) (4)2" allows the division of a class into subclasses "[w]here a class is found
to include subclasses divergent in interest ... ,,"I t has been recognized that
in order to effectuate the purpose of the securities laws, "courts should employ
the full measure of the discretion granted by the Rule, whenever a fair reading
of the complaint permits, to define classes of injured investors in a manner which
will permit utilization of the class action procedure."26 Also, it was evident that
dual grounds of commonality did exist between Green and all the other members
of the class. In each prospectus the major portion of the overstated amount
was traced to the misrepresentation in one account - that of Tidelands Motor
Inn." Besides this common question in regard to Tidelands, the Second Circuit
found that the interrelated misrepresentations in all three prospectuses were
indicative of Wolf engaging "in a common course of conduct designed to con-
tinually manipulate the market price of Wolf stock."2 " This common scheme
ingredient, which was sometimes used under old Rule 23,'29 was approved under
new Rule 23 in Fischer v. Kletz. 9 In that decision, the corporate defendant had
falsely overstated its earnings and revenue in seven financial statements over a
two year period with the result of inflating the value of the company's securities.
The federal court for the Southern District of New York concluded that the
issuance of "a series of false and misleading statements based on cumulative and
interrelated data" constituted a common course of conduct which met the com-
mon question requirement."'
The other, and perhaps the greater, obstacle to the maintenance of a 10b-5
class action was meeting the standards of Rule 23(b). Subdivision b(3), the
alternative condition utilized in 10b-5 suits, requires the court to find that com-
mon questions of fact or law predominate as to all members of the class and that
a class action is superior to alternative ways of conducting the litigation. 2
In determining the predominance of common over individual questions, the
critical test appears to be whether there is "material variation" in elements
like the representations made by the defendants to different members of a
plaintiff class or the degrees of reliance by members of the class.33
Prior to Green there had been some conflict at the district court level as to
whether varying degrees of individual reliance would defeat the predominance
of the common questions."' The majority of the decisions appeared to express
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4) provides:
When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and
each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed
and applied accordingly.
25 Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure No. 23, 39 F.R.D. 98,
106 (1965).
26 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
27 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 299-300 (2d Cir. 1968).
28 Id. at 300.
29 E.g., Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1964).
30 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
31 Id. at 381.
32 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3), quoted in full at note 21 supra.
33 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRITiEs LAW: FRAUD--SEC RULE 10B-5 § 11.6, at 257-58 (1968).
See also Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 25, at 103.
34 Compare Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D. N.Y. 1966), Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton,
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the notion that the common issues in class actions need not be dispositive of the
entire litigation. 5 Green openly confirmed this view when it found that the com-
mon questions of misrepresentation were predominant over individual questions
of reliance."8 By recommending the use of "split trials,"" the court substantively
applied Rule 23 (c) (4) which provides that an action may be maintained as a
class action to particular issues only. This recommendation also recognized the
court's power to make appropriate orders "to prevent undue repetition or com-
plication in the presentation of evidence or argument .... "3
The procedure that would be followed in settling the remaining individual
questions is best explained by the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23:
[Mn a fraud or similar case the action may retain its "class" character only
through the adjudication of liability to the class; the members of the 'class
may thereafter be required to come in individually and prove the amounts
of their respective claims.39
Therefore, such questions as damages and reliance could be individually deter-
mined after a proper resolution of the common questions. While the Green court
did not verify defendant's contention that proof of reliance by each member of
the class is necessary for every lOb-5 action, it affirmed the belief that reliance
is at least lurking in the background. 0 Assuming that reliance exists in every
lOb-5 case, the court necessarily had to conclude that individual questions of
reliance were subservient to the common questions. Otherwise, the only effective
means of attaining civil relief in a 10b-5 suit - the class action - would be
foiled. In addition, the Second Circuit had already admitted that suits involving
section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb-5, "though
often involving separate consideration of the elements of misrepresentation and
reliance as they affect individual members, have also been accorded treatment
as class actions under the new rule [23].'
The superiority of the class action over other methods available for a fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy - admittedly the most important
requirement to be met under a subdivision b(3) class action - was the last
issue to be analyzed by the Green court. The court agreed with the Seventh
Circuit's conclusion in Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co.42 that the most
relevant question in determining the superiority of the class action procedure is
the size of the class.4 This formulation of a numbers criterion44 reflects the
Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 '(S.D.N.Y. 1966), and Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259
F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), all of which upheld the maintenance of a class action despite
various degrees of reliance by class members, with Berger v. Puralator Products, Inc., 41
F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), and Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 5 F.R.D. 56 (D. Del. 1945)
'(old Rule 23), which denied the class action.
35 See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
36 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 300 (2d Cir. 1968).
37 Id. at 301.
38 FmD. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1).
39 Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 25, at 106.
40 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968).
41 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 565 (2d Cir. 1968).
42 399 F.2d 711 '(7th Cir. 1968).
43 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968).
44 The reliance on the numerical size of the class to determine the superiority of the class
action device over the available alternatives of joinder, intervention, consolidation, and the
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purpose of the class action- especially the b(3) type. Concerning Rule
23(b)(3), the Advisory Committee's Note states: "Subdivision(b) (3) en-
compasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time,
effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decisions as to persons similarly
situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other un-
desirable results."45 These economies are directly proportioned to the number of
claims or possible suits the class action device will settle. For plaintiff Green, a
class membership of over 2,000 made the class action his most feasible device.
The superiority of the class action in Green over the alternatives of joinder,
intervention, consolidation, and the test case stands out even more when the
class action is considered as furthering the objectives of the federal securities
laws. It is acknowledged that there is a need for private action in the securities
field because civil relief supplements any SEC action "by both affording relief
to those injured by violations of the securities laws and serving as a deterrent
to future wrong-doing."4 When this is coupled with the fact that the class action
is practically the sole method of civil relief in securities violations,4 ' no cogent
argument can be proposed to refute the contention that it is the superior technique
to be employed. The knowledge that investors possess a group remedy against a
securities law violator acts as a practical check on many securities abuses.4" But
this prophylactic function can only be effective when courts liberally construe
Rule 23's provisions to allow optimum use of the class action. Green is a prime
example of a court's liberal interpretation of Rule 23 and utilization of that
Rule's inherent flexibility to better serve the function of a class action in a
securities fraud suit.
After a favorable determination on the class action issue, the Second Circuit
turned to the question of the punitive damages. However, unlike the striking of
the class action allegation, the striking of the punitive damages portion of the
complaint would not have terminated the litigation.49 Thus, the order was not
immediately appealable."0 Nevertheless, since a favorable opinion on the class
action allegation was rendered, the court provided guidelines to the district court
on the punitive damages issue in order to avoid the attendant expense and delay
of a possible retrial.5 Following the almost unanimous principle of prior district
test case should not be confused with the recent holding in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), which denounced reliance on quantitative elements as a factor in
determining the "adequacy of representation" [Rule 23(a) (4)] of the representative of the
class.
45 Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 25, at 102-03.
46 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
47 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
48 Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 I-Aav.
L. REV. 658, 662-63 '(1956).
49 This point is discussed at note 20 supra.
50 The court relied on Harvey Aluminum v. International Longshoremen's Union, Local
8, 278 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1960), which held that an order striking from the complaint the
allegations praying for punitive damages was not a final order or decision within the meaning
of section 1291 of Tide 28 of the United States Code. Id.
51 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302 (2d Cir. 1968).
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court cases 2 and legal authorities," the court of appeals interpreted section
28(a)54 of the 1934 law as precluding recovery of punitive damages in all
Exchange Act suits.
The most recent and elaborate judicial expression of punitive damages in
relation to securities law violation was noted in Globus v. Law Research Service,
Inc.5 Although that case was the first56 to award punitive damages under the
Securities Act of 1933,5" it contained pertinent dicta on section 28 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. In interpreting section 28, the district court judge be-
lieved that
the second clause of § 28(a) .. .should be read only as indicating that in
no event shall double compensatory damages be recovered by reason of the
fact that plaintiff alleges alternative theories for relief... and that puntitive
or exemplary damages are not recoverable for violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.55 (Emphasis added.)
The result in Green is consistent with this dictum from Globus. However, there
are statements in Green which hint at a limitation on the scope of the Globus
holding. The Second Circuit thought the policies behind punitive damages were
not being furthered by allowing such awards in a 10b-5 suit.59 "Punitive dam-
ages can be justified only as retribution or as a deterrent measure."'60 The im-
position of punitive damages upon a publicly held corporation fulfills little re-
tributive function because many innocent shareholders bear the burden. Any
statement to the effect that punitive damages perform a deterrent function upon
lOb-5 violations must be analyzed in the context of the Exchange Act. Section
52 E.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968). ("[Tlhe only effect of this provision [section 28(a)] is to prohibit puntitive damages
... Id. at 748"); Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
393 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1968) ("The corporation's actual damages are recoverable. . . . No
punitive damages are recoverable." Id. at 364.); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp.
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ("The narrow point raised by the motion is whether punitive damages
may be recovered .... [T]he Act expressly provides in section 28, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb, that a
plaintiff may never recover more than his 'actual damages.'" Id.).
53 E.g., BROMBERG, supra note 33 '("Section 28(a) does preclude punitive damages." Id. §
9.1, at 229); 3 Loss, supra note 8 ("But § 28(a) of the 1934 act has been held to rule out
exemplary damages." Id. at 1624 n.5.); Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Rule
lOb-5, 20 Sw L.J. 620 (1966) ("Thus, any recovery of exemplary damages in a 10(b) action is
precluded. . . . [R]ights of action under the Exchange Act are 'remedial' and not 'penal' in
nature." Id. at 624).
54 Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb (1964), reads:
(a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to
any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no per-
son permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provision of this chapter
shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount
in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of. Nothing in this
chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or
officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar
as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder.
55 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
56 54 VA. L. Rlv. 1560, 1565 (1968).
57 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
58 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).




321 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes criminal sanctions upon
violators of the Act. The possibility of confinement or stigma of a criminal record
are greater deterrents to wrongful conduct than the mere imposition of monetary
sanctions." In addition to the criminal penalties, express or implied civil actions
are available. Through such devices as the class action and the shareholder's
derivative suit, large claims can be recovered against violators. As pointed out
earlier, this in itself serves as a deterrent to securities abuses." But neither the
criminal sanctions nor the group civil remedy devices are limited to the 1934 Act.
They are both also used under the 1933 Act 4 Thus the policy of allowing
punitive damages would seem to serve no real function in these securities fraud
actions, regardless of whether they are decided under the 1933 or 1934 securities
laws.
There is language in Globus to the effect that punitive damages will aid in
deterring fraud generally in the sale of securities: "An award of punitive damages
as a means of deterring fraudulent conduct of a heinous character, such as was
found by the jury here, also accords with the overall purpose of the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1933 Act."65 Green rejected the theory that punitive damages
can be an effective third tier deterrent behind criminal sanctions and group civil
remedies. 6 It is submitted that since the federal courts have the power to de-
termine the availability of possible remedies in an implied cause of action,6 7 the
Green decision may influence some courts to limit Globus to those situations
where either group civil remedies are unavailable or where an award of punitive
damages can have a direct, personal retributive effect on the securities law
violator.
Thomas J. DeLuca
UNFAIR COMPETITION - FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT - THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION LACKS JURISDICTION OVER NONPROFIT CORPO-
RATIONS ORGANIZED FOR AND ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN BUSINESS FOR ONLY
CHARITABLE PURPOSES. - A commercial blood bank commenced operation in
Kansas City, Missouri in May, 1955 under the name of Midwest Blood Bank
and Plasma Center [Midwest].' Midwest's objective was to serve as a central
supplier of human whole blood on a profit making basis for the numerous hos-
pitals in the Kansas City area. At the time, most of the area hospitals operated
their own individual banks or borrowed from others. However, the increasing
61 48 Stat. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1964).
62 Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Dam-
ages, 41 N.Y.U. L. R.v. 1158, 1161-62 '(1966).
63 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
64 Section 24 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964),
imposes criminal sanctions. For an example of the group civil remedies under the 1933 Securi-
ties Act, see Escott v.BarChris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965).
65 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
66 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968).
67 See 54 VA. L. Rav. 1560, 1562-63 & n.7 (1968).
1 This statement of facts is taken from the Initial Decision of the Hearing Examiner,




demands for blood rendered this system unsatisfactory. The dissatisfaction had
been recognized by the Jackson County Medical Society. Prior to the opening of
Midwest in 1955, the Society had attempted to generate support for the establish-
ment of a nonprofit community blood bank to serve the needs of the area hos-
pitals. Discussions were instituted with the Kansas City Area Hospital. Associa-
tion [AHA]2 as early as 1953, but little progress had been made by the time
Midwest commenced operations. The commercial blood bank was viewed un-
favorably in Kansas City medical circles because of an aversion to the idea of
"trafficking" in blood and a feeling that the personnel and procedures used at
Midwest were substandard. Because of this feeling there were incidents in-
volving refusals by individual hospitals in the area to accept delivery of blood
from Midwest.
In early 1956, various interested groups in the community - AHA, Jack-
son County Medical Society, area pathologists, hospital administrators, members
of the medical profession and prominent citizens - finally agreed that a com-
munity blood bank would be the best solution to the area's blood needs A
nonprofit corporation was organized under the name of Community Blood Bank
of the Kansas City Area, Inc. [Community] and it commenced operations in
April, 1958. Because of its local origins and support,3 Community was able to
acquire the affiliation of all but a few of the area hospitals by 1962. The prac-
tical effect of this arrangement was that most of the hospitals dealt exclusively
with Community for their blood needs to the detriment of Midwest and its suc-
cessor, World Blood Bank' [World]. During the period from 1958 to 1962 inci-
dents continued to occur in which area hospitals and Community refused to
accept delivery of blood from Midwrest and World as a replacement for blood
used by hospital patients who had blood supplier contracts with Midwest and
World. The reasons given were the alleged substandard quality of blood issued
by Midwest and World and their failure to adhere to the blood delivery rules of
the North Central Blood Bank Clearing House.'
On July 5, 1962, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint5
against Community, a nonprofit corporation, and its officers, directors and agents;
AHA, a nonprofit corporation, and its officers, directors, agents and certain
2 The Kansas City Area Hospital Association is a nonprofit corporation composed of
individual area hospitals that are volunteer participants in the Association. It is funded by
loans, grants, gifts, and dues from member hospitals. It serves as an agency to make studies
and to survey, collect, integrate and analyze data in the field of hospital activities in the
Kansas City area. Such studies are supplied to about 1,000 agencies- including hospitals, city
and state officials, United States Public Health Service, etc. Id. at 133.
3 The governing body of Community.is composed of thirty-nine directors. Groups of
thirteen are chosen from the medical profession in Kansas City, AHA (representatives of area
hospitals), and public figures from outside the medical profession. Id. at 114-15.
4 Blood bank clearing houses are similar to monetary clearing houses. All member blood
banks deal through the clearing house when forwarding blood or receiving it from other banks.
This way a bank only has one account with the clearing house rather than individual accounts
with every bank with which it deals. Member banks are not supposed to ship blood directly
to each other unless ordered to do so by the clearing house. Petitioners alleged that the failure
of Midwest and World to use these procedures when delivering blood was one of the reasons
that the deliveries were refused. Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1014
n.4 (8th Cir. 1969).




member hospitals; and twenty-six pathologists who were affiliated with hospitals
in the Kansas City area [these organizations and individuals will be collectively
referred to as "petitioners"]. The Commission alleged that the petitioners had
entered into a common course of action to hamper and restrain the sale and dis-
tribution of human whole blood in interstate commerce, and that they carried
out this combination by committing unfair practices in refusing to deal with
Midwest and World between 1955 and 1962. The petitioners challenged the
jurisdiction of the Commission on the grounds that the corporate petitioners
(Community, AHA, and the hospitals) were nonprofit corporations not within
the Commission's jurisdiction, and that the officers, directors, agents, and pathol-
ogists were acting solely as representatives of the corporations and thereby were
not subject to being named individually.
The jurisdictional challenge was rejected by the Hearing Examiner, who
found that the petitioners had engaged in acts that constituted unfair practices
under the Federal Trade Commission Act.6 The Commission agreed with the
findings of the Hearing Examiner and issued an order to the petitioners to cease
and desist from their unfair methods of competition in refusing to deal with the
commercial blood bank." The petitioners then appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which set aside the Commission's order
and held: the Commission was without jurisdiction under section 4 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,' because the corporate petitioners were true
nonprofit corporations, not engaged in business for profit for themselves or their
members. Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, No.
18,645 (8th Cir., Jan. 10, 1969).
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act9 states that unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive practices in commerce are illegal. It
empowers the Commission to prevent the use of such practices ° by issuing a
complaint against any party whom it has reason to believe may be using pro-
hibited practices. 1 If the Commission determines that there has been a violation
of the Act it will order the offending party to cease and desist from engaging in
unfair methods of competition.' A failure to obey such an order would subject
the offending party to civil penalties of up to $5,000 for each violation."
Section 5 contains no delineation of specific acts that constitute unfair com-
petition or unfair practices in restraint of trade. The Commission is left with
broad discretion to investigate any and all trade practices and make its own
determination of fairness or unfairness based on the circumstances of a particular
situation, normal trade practices, and the practical requirements of the business
in question.'" While it does have this broad power to rule on the competitive
practices used in commerce, the Commission's authority is limited by the juris-
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
7 Community Blood Bank, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRAIE REG. REp. 17,728
(FTC 1966).
8 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1964).
9 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
10 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964).
11 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
12 Id.
13 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1964).
14 FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 396 (1953).
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dictional boundaries set out in the Act."5 The general proposition is that the
Commission is empowered to prevent "persons, partnerships, or corporations"
from engaging in unfair methods of competition. 6 However, certain groups are
exempted from this general proviso, namely, banks, common carriers, air car-
riers subject to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958," and those parties subject to
the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921."8 The Commission's jurisdiction is
further limited by statutory definition. The Commission has jurisdiction to de-
tennine unfair competition charges over "corporations" only to the extent allowed
by the definition of that word in section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act:'"
"Corporation" shall be deemed to include any company, trust, so-called
Massachusetts trust, or association, incorporated or unincorporated, which
is organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members,
and has shares of capital or capital stock or certificates of interest, and any
company... incorporated or unincorporated, without shares of capital...
which is organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its
members.20 (Emphasis added.)
This definition raises the question of how the phrase "organized to carry on
business for its own profit or that of its members" should be interpreted for the
purpose of including corporations within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
In Community Blood Bank all of the corporate petitioners (Community,
AHA, and the hospitals) were organized as nonprofit charitable corporations
under the laws of Missouri and Kansas.2 Despite this nonprofit form, the Com-
mission made the determination that they were organized to carry on business
for their own profit or that of their members within the meaning of section 4.
In their appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the petitioners challenged all of the Com-
mission's findings, but their primary contention was that the Commission was
without jurisdiction. 2 The court seized upon the jurisdictional issue as foremost
in the case, stating the substantive question to be whether "corporation" as de-
fined in section 4 of the Act "embraces any and all nonprofit corporations re-
gardless of their objectives, motives and the results of their operations.""2
The position taken by the Commission on this point was set out in its de-
cision ordering the petitioners to cease and desist from using unfair practices in
15 The Commission only has such jurisdiction as given it by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act. FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 559 (1926).
16 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964).
17 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1964).
18 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (1964).
19 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1964).
20 Id.
21 Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 1969).
22 Brief for Petitioners at 52, Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th
Cir. ,1969). The petitioners also argued that the Commission lacked jurdisdiction over the
subject matter on the grounds that human whole blood (living tissue) is not a commodity
or article of commerce within the meaning of section 5; that the process of hemotherapy
constitutes a medical service; that the evidence failed to establish any common cause of action
among the petitioners to restrain interstate commerce in blood; that the proceeding was not in
the public interest; and that they had been denied due process in the proceeding. Id. at
52-98.
23 Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 1969).
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dealing with Midwest and World. 4 The basic proposition was that the non-
profit form of the corporate petitioners did not necessarily take them out of the
Commission's jurisdiction. Incorporation under state not-for-profit statutes and
federal income tax exemptions were not considered the proper criteria by which
to delineate the Commission's jurisdiction over corporations. The test in section 4
for inclusion of a corporation within the jurisdiction of the Commission is phrased
in the same terms for a corporation with shares of capital and one without
shares of capital (nonprofit) - is it "organized to carry on business for its own
profit or that of its members"? Normally, "to carry on business for its own
profit" means to realize a pecuniary gain that will inure to the benefit of the
corporation or that will be distributed to the member shareholders. However,
the Commission felt that the phrase should not be interpreted in its traditional
sense when applied to corporations without shares of capital such as the corporate
petitioners. This conclusion was based on an interpretation of the history of the
definition in section 4, and its application to the modern day commercial structure.
The original definition of "corporation" as contained in section 4 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act of 19142" distinguished between a corporation
with shares of capital and one without shares of capital. A corporation with
shares came within the Commission's jurisdiction if "organized to carry on busi-
ness for profit." A corporation without shares was included if "organized to
carry on business for its own profit or that of its members."2 The Wheeler-Lea
Act of 193827 amended the definition by making the test the same for both, i.e.,
"organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members." How-
ever, the Commission felt that the discrepancy in the original version was sig-
nificant. There is a fundamental difference between these corporations with and
those without shares of capital. The former are in business to realize a "profit"
in the generally accepted sense of the word - a pecuniary gain that will be dis-
tributed to the shareholders. However, a corporation without shares of capital
has no shareholders and therefore it does not distribute "profit." Considering
this fundamental difference along with the different tests used in the original
version of section 4, the Commission came to the conclusion that
[t]he phrase "organized to carry on business for its own profit . ." when
applied to such a corporation [without capital shares], must, therefore, have
a different meaning from the traditional phrase "organized to carry on
business for profit," which is applied to corporations having capital stock
or shares of capital.
28
Although the test phrases were worded the same as each other in the amended
Act, the Commission gave them different interpretations. In dealing with cor-
porations having shares of capital, the word "profit" would mean pecuniary
benefit inuring to the corporation or to be distributed to the shareholders. But
24 Community Blood Bank, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,728
(FTC 1966).
25 Ch. 311, § 4, 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
26 Id.
27 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1964).
28 Community Blood Bank, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REo. REP. 17,728,
at 23,018 (FTC 1966).
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as applied to corporations without shares of capital, the Commission interpreted
"profit" to mean any income left over after expenditures that was used for the
self-perpetuation or expansion of the corporation. Under this interpretation,
the corporate petitioners (with no shares of capital) were considered to be in
business for "profit" within the meaning of section 4, because they were so
organized that any excess income could be used for self-perpetuation or expansion.
The court of appeals took a dim view of the Commission's varying inter-
pretations of the phrase "organized to carry on business for its own profit or
that of its members." In the court's opinion,
[n]either the legislative history of the Act nor the language of § 4 sup-
ports the Commission's theory that Congress intended that "profi?' is to
be given different meanings depending upon the character of the corporation
under consideration. Additionally, the strained interpretation of the Com-
mission runs counter to the principle "that Congress will be presumed to
have used a word in its usual and well-settled sense.'
'2 9
Profit, in its "usual and well-settled sense," means pecuniary benefit inuring to
the organization or its members. This was the meaning the Commission gave to
the phrase "organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its mem-
bers" when applied to a corporation with shares of capital. Since the phrase
is worded exactly the same for a corporation without shares of capital, the court
felt that it should be interpreted in the same manner. Such a corporation should
be within the jurisdiction of the Commission only if it is in business for profit in
the traditional and generally accepted meaning of the word.
In reaching this determination, the court went beyond the plain wording
of the statute. It also took note of the delineation of jurisdiction over corpora-
tions in other antitrust laws. The relevant sections of the Sherman Act 0 and
the Clayton Act"' are structured to encompass all corporations. The Robinson-
Patman Act 2 delineates those organizations which are exempt from its provisions
- "schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals, and har-
itable institutions not operated for profit."" In section 4 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, it can be seen that Congress chose to use neither the sweeping
inclusion of the Sherman and Clayton Acts nor the specific exclusions of the
Robinson-Patman Act. By using the phrase "organized to carry on business for
its own profit or that of its members," Congress gave the Commission jurisdiction
over all normally commercial organizations and also enabled it to pierce the non-
corporate veil of those organizations that are ostensibly nonprofit but are actually
being used to serve the pecuniary interests of their directors and members, or
29 Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 1969), citing
United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 63 (1940).
30 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1964) reads as follows:
The word "person" .. .shall be deemed to include corporations and associations
existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of, any
of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.
31 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964). Section 12 is identical to section 7 of the Sherman Act, which
is quoted in full at note 30 supra.




other corporations. 4 The court saw this as a congressional recognition of the
distinction between business corporations and true nonprofit charitable corpo-
rations, and as an indication that the latter were to be excluded from the Com-
mission's jurisdiction. 5
In Community Blood Bank, the corporate petitioners qualified as true non-
profit charitable corporations. They were organized solely for charitable and
educational purposes, no income was to be distributed to the benefit of any of
the members, officers, or directors, and they did not exist as devices or instru-
mentalities of individuals or firms that sought monetary gain through the use of
their nonprofit corporate structure. Therefore, the court did not think that the
Commission could acquire jurisdiction over them by giving "profit" an inter-
pretation that would destroy the apparent exclusion of true nonprofit charitable
corporations from the Federal Trade Commission Act.
The Commission's contention that the corporate petitioners were embraced
within the definition of section 4 was its main basis for assuming jurisdiction.
However, the Commission also set out alternative grounds in support of juris-
diction. It stated that even if the corporate petitioners did not come within the
section 4 definition of "corporation," it would still be able to adjudicate their
participation in the alleged common cause of action against Midwest and World
under the doctrine of conspiracy.3 6 The Commission would treat the alleged
conspiracy among the corporate petitioners as a partnership and proceed against
it under the statutory grant of authority over partnerships contained in section
5(a) (6) of the Act."
The court could find no support for this "novel and ingenious" theory as-
serted by the Commission. The four cases that had been cited by the Commission
in support of it were distinguished as irrelevant. Three were criminal prose-
cutions under antitrust laws other than the Federal Trade Commission Act,
and one was an action in equity for an injunction that involved an evidentiary
problem." None of the cases involved the specific contention proposed by the
Commission - that it had jurisdiction over nonprofit corporations as partners
to a conspiracy under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
The Commission also stated that even though it might lack jurisdiction
over the corporate petitioners, it still had the power to determine the existence
of the alleged conspiracy and the identity of the co-conspirators. Such a de-
termination would not give the Commission jurisdiction over those corporate
petitioners found to be conspirators if it otherwise lacked jurisdiction. However,
34 See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Chamber of Commerce v. FTC,
13 F.2d 673 (8th Cir., 1926).
35 Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir. 1969).
36 Community Blood Bank, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,728, at
23,019 (FTC 1966).
37 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1964).
38 These cases, in the order discussed by the court, were: United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S.
601 (1910) (involved the question of continuance of a conspiracy for statute of limitation
purposes); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 253-54 (1940) (involved
the question of the acts of a conspiracy as binding all the other conspirators in a partnership) ;
Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946) (decided on the question of the necessity of
overt acts as marking the duration and scope of the partnership to conspire).
39 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mfitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (decided on the issue of
admissibility of conspiracy declarations as against each co-conspirator).
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the Commission felt that an order could be indirectly enforced against the cor-
porations involved in the conspiracy by enforcing it against the officers, directors,
agents and employees of such corporations in their individual capacities.40 The
Federal Trade Commission Act grants the Commission jurisdiction over all
"persons" whether or not they are acting for profit."' By restraining the individual
officers, directors, agents, and pathologists named in the complaint in Community
Blood Bank, the Commission would be able to effectuate indirect jurisdiction
over the nonprofit corporate petitioners. Two cases, Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC"
and Standard Distributors, Inc. v. FTC,"3 were cited in support of enforcement
of an order against individual directors or officers of corporations.
The court noted a number of distinguishing characteristics between the cited
cases and the situation in Community Blood Bank. In the cited cases, the Com-
mission had jurisdiction over the named corporations (Benrus and Standard)
and had found them to be in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
The individual officers were included in the Commission's order because they
had been the policy-makers and directors of the offending corporations and had
profited by the violations of the Act. The idea was to make the order more
effective by including them individually. In Community Blood Bank, the court
noted that the officers, directors, agents, and pathologists named in the com-
plaint and order were acting entirely in a representative capacity on behalf of
the corporate petitioners or other area hospitals (mostly nonprofit organizations)
over whom the Commission had no jurisdiction. They were "public spirited"
volunteers who derived no personal benefit from the activities of the blood bank.
The fact that the Commission had jurisdiction over the corporation in Benrus
and Standard and the consideration of the individuals striving for profit were
not present in Community Blood Bank. The court reiterated the feelings of dis-
senting Commissioner Elman on this point:
[T]he distinction made in the Act between corporations acting for profit
and nonprofit corporations would be erased if all the Commission had to
do, in order to obtain jurisdiction, was to name the officers, directors, and
other personnel of a nonprofit corporation as the respondents. . . Such
a result flouts the express policy of Congress of exempting nonprofit cor-
porations from the Commission's jurisdiction.44
The decision in Community Blood Bank has been acclaimed as "signif-
icant" 5 and "an important victory"' 6 for nonprofit organizations across the
country. That this is so cannot be denied. If the Commission's order had been
allowed to stand, a serious blow would have been struck against the efforts of
40 Community Blood Bank, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TaADE REG. REP. 17,728,
at 23,020 (FTC 1966).
41 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964).
42 352 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1965).
43 211 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1954).
44 Community Blood Bank, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,728,
at 23,039 (FTC 1966). See Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011, 1021 (8th
Cir. 1969).
45 'Wall Street Journal, Jan. 14, 1969, at 8, col. 2.
46 Kansas City Times, Jan. 22, 1969, at 28, col. 1.
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volunteer blood banks, at a time when blood shortages are increasing." Also,
valuable precedent would have been established by which the Commission could
have extended its authority over numerous other nonprofit organizations such
as hospitals, churches, charities, fraternal orders and the like. However, these
are only the more practical considerations underlying the decision, which do not
reach to the heart of the legal issues involved.
The basic question in Community Blood Bank dealt with the extent to which
the Commission would be allowed to expand its jurisdiction in order to prevent
unfair methods of competition and illegal combinations in restraint of trade
from becoming widespread. The Commission has the power to pierce the non-
profit corporate veil of any so-called nonprofit organizations that are actually
organized to carry on business for the benefit of some officers or members."
From this premise, the question evolves into whether the Commission can pierce
the apparent immunity of a true nonprofit charitable corporation if such a corpo-
ration is engaged in unfair practices and conspiratorial activities which contra-
vene established antitrust policies.49 The Commission's attempt to make such an
extension in Community Blood Bank has revealed an underlying clash of policy
considerations. On one hand there is the policy of enforcement of the antitrust
laws to their fullest extent by the Commission. On the other hand, there is the
congressional policy of excluding true nonprofit charitable corporations from the
Commission's jurisdiction. There may be merit to the Commission's idea that
public sponsored projects (such as blood banks, hospitals, etc.) which encourage
charitable public participation should not be allowed to engage in unfair practices
or methods of competition to the extent that they hinder the growth of legitimate
private competitors.5" However, it would appear from the plain language of
section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,5 ' and from the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation of it in Community Blood Bank, that the policy of excluding true
nonprofit charitable corporations from the Commission's jurisdiction is the domi-
nant consideration at the present time. The Commission's attempt to override
this consideration with an extremely broad and destructive interpretation of
rather unambiguous statutory language was a failure. As long as Congress feels
that the policy of exclusion of nonprofit organizations should take precedence,
the Commission will have to restrict its efforts under the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act to those corporations organized to carry on business for the profit of
themselves or their members.
John G. Bambrick, Jr.
47 Wall Street Journal, Jan. 14, 1969, at 8, col. 2.
48 See cases cited in note 34 supra.
49 This is not to imply that the petitioners in Community Blood Bank were engaged in
such activity. Although the Commission found them to be violating section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, this finding was never discussed by the court. (The petitioners con-
tended that the Commission erred in its finding that they were engaged in a common cause
of action to hinder Midwest and World. See note 22 supra.)
50 Community Blood Bank, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADn REG. REP. 117,728,
at 23,036 (FTC 1966).
51 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1964).
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NEGLIGENCE - PARENT-CHILD - NEW YORK ABROGATES PARENT-CHILD
IMMUNITY DOCTRNE.-MrS. Adele Gelbman was a passenger in an automobile
owned by her and operated by her unemancipated minor son, James. While
proceeding along a major thoroughfare in White Plains, New York, the auto-
mobile collided with another vehicle and Mrs. Gelbman was seriously injured.
She commenced an action against her son James for negligent driving. The in-
surance company, representing James, interposed as an affirmative defense its
contention that the suit was barred by the doctrine of parent-child immunity.
Relying upon past decisions of the court of appeals, the trial court dismissed the
complaint and the appellate division unanimously affirmed. The New York
Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and held: since the reason behind the
original adoption of parent-child immunity no longer exists, the doctrine is
abolished. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529 (1969).
It was well established in early English common law that an action would
lie between parent and child for a breach of contract, and also in tort for in-
juries to property.' However, for some unknown reason, the issue of whether
such an action would lie in tort for personal injuries had never been adjudicated.'
This exact issue was not raised in American common law until 1891.s In that
year, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the landmark case of Hewellette v.
George,4 held that an unemancipated minor child could not sue her parents for
the intentional tort of false imprisonment.' The Mississippi court made the fol-
lowing unsupported policy declaration which eventually was to snowball into
an American common law doctrine:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound
public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best in-
terests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the
assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the
hands of the parents.6
Twelve years later, the theory of parent-child immunity received a tre-
mendous boost when the Tennessee Supreme Court, in McKelvey v. McKelvey,'
declared that the theory was a rule of common law. Hewellette, which never
purported to announce a common law rule, was the sole support for the Ten-
nessee court's declaration.' In 1905, the Washington Supreme Court, in Roller
v. Roller,9 expounded upon and polished the reasoning behind the immunity
doctrine. The Roller court stated:
1 For a collection of authorities on this point, see Comment, Tort Actions Between
Members of The Family - Husband & Wife - Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 180
n.146 (1961).
2 Id. at 180. See also-Aimot., 19 A.L.R. 2d 423, 425 (1951).
3 There were, however, three American cases prior to 1891 which dealt with personal
injuries inflicted by persons standing in loco parentis. For a discussion of American law in this
area prior to 1891, see Duttlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H.1352, 357-58, 150 A. 905, 908 (1930);
Annot., supra note 2, at 425.
4 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
5, Id. at 710, 9 So. at 887.
6 Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
7 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
8 Id. at 390, 77 S.W. at 664.
9 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 "(1905).
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The rule of law prohibiting suits between parent and child is based upon
the interest that society has in preserving harmony in the domestic relations,
an interest which has been manifested since the earliest organization of
civilized government, an interest inspired by the universally recognized
fact that the maintenance of harmonious and proper family relations is
conducive to good citizenship, and therefore works to the welfare of the
state.10
In refusing to allow the plaintiff to recover against her father for rape, the
Washington court unknowingly demonstrated the absurdity which could result
from a mechanical application of the rule. The plaintiff argued that the har-
monious relation had already been disturbed to its limits and, therefore, the
reasons for the immunity rule were totally inapplicable.1 The court admitted
that "[t]here seems to be some reason in this argument," 2 but stated that "if
it be once established that a child has a right to sue a parent for a tort, there is
no practical line of demarkation [sic] which can be drawn .... "13
Hewellette, McKelvey and Roller have been referred to as "the great trilogy
upon which the American rule of parent-child tort immunity is based."' 4 These
three cases created a doctrine which came to be accepted by nearly every juris-
diction in America that considered the issue in the context of negligent personal
torts. 5 During this period of assimilation, the original family harmony rationale
was buttressed by other policy arguments in favor of the existence of the immunity.
These newer rationales could be classified into such categories as "fear of fraud,"
"depletion of the family exchequer," and "possibility of succession."'"
Although courts also had begun developing exceptions to the rule,' it was
not until 1930, in the New Hampshire case of Dunlap v. Dunlap,"" that the
immunity was first subjected to an actual frontal attack. In an opinion which
has been highly praised' and is probably the most well reasoned in the area,
the New Hampshire court allowed recovery to an unemancipated minor who was
negligently injured while in the employ of his father. Dunlap was the first case
to recognize that there had never existed a general common law rule that a child
could not sue his parent.2" Instead, the court concluded that the immunity
doctrine was the exception to the much broader rule that a "minor has the same
right to redress for wrongs as any other individual."" Thus, the immunity would
exist only when it was in the interest of public policy that a child be disabled from
bringing suit rather than because the parent had violated no duty. 2 In the Dunlap
10 Id. at 243-44, 79 P. at 788.
11 Id. at 244, 79 P. at 788.
12 Id.
13 Id., 79 P. at 789.
14 Comment, supra note 1, at 182.
15 For a list of these cases, see id. at 183 n.168.
16 These and other similar reasons are listed and discussed at some length in McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1072-77 (1930); Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 187-93.
17 These exceptions are listed and discussed in Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of The
Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 206-18 (1967).
18 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
19 See, e.g., Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 433, 224 A.2d 588, 589 (1966); Annot.,
supra note 2, at 430.
20 84 N.H. at 354, 150 A. at 906.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 372, 150 A. at 915.
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court's opinion, the only time the immunity should be employed was when the
suit would undermine parental authority and disrupt family unity.'- The court
recognized that other reasons for the application of the immunity had been
developed, but considered these as "mere makeweights, to add something to the
persuasiveness of the more substantial" '24 parental authority and family peace
arguments. The court specifically denounced the mechanical application of the
immunity - as in Roller - and noted that the issue of whether the immunity
should be allowed was a practical one to which no rule of thumb could be ap-
plied.25 A major factor in the court's decision was the presence of liability in-
surance. Insurance, the court felt, emasculated the reason for the immunity,
because as a practical matter the parent would lose nothing.28
Dunlap established the initial major attack on the immunity doctrine, and
its practical approach soon received the applause of numerous authors, com-
mentators and dissenting judges." Nevertheless, the immunity doctrine con-
tinued to stand in every jurisdiction until 1963, although it had become severely
eroded by exceptions. One dissenting judge stated that in his opinion, the "ex-
ceptions.., have almost swallowed the rule."2 Then, in 1963, Wisconsin became
the first jurisdiction to strike the immunity doctrine a fatal blow. In Goller v.
White,"0 Wisconsin's Supreme Court abrogated the rule save for two exceptions:
(1) situations involving an exercise of parental authority, and (2) situations
involving an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the pro-
vision of necessaries. 1 Wisconsin, having started a trend, was followed three
years later by Minnesota. There, in Baits v. Balts,3 the court for all practical
purposes abrogated the rule by allowing a mother to bring suit against her son
for injuries sustained as a result of his negligent driving. Finally, New Hamp-
shire, in the case of Briere v. Briere 3 became the first jurisdiction to abrogate
the immunity doctrine in its entirety. The Briere court?4 relied strongly on the
reasoning in Dunlap, and refused to be impressed by the fact that the majority
of jurisdictions upheld the immunity:
We do not believe that our case should be determined by the number of
authorities which support one rule or the other, any more than that a jury
23 Id. at 354, 150 A. at 906.
24 Id. at 361, 150 A. at 909.
25 Id. at 363, 150 A. at 910-11.
26 Id. at 370, 150 A. at 914.
27 For an impressive list of the writings of these authors and commentators see Hastings
v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 254-55, 162 A.2d 147, 151 (1960) *(dissenting opinion); for a list of
the dissenting opinions, see Comment, supra note 17, at 218 n.121.
28 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
29 Badigan v. Badigan, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 478, 174 N.E.2d 718, 722, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 40
(1961) (Fuld, dissenting).
30 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
31 Id. at -, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
32 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966). Although the court stated that it was not to
be understood as abrogating the immunity in actions by a child against a parent, it has been
suggested that for all practical purposes, that is what the court in fact did. See Comment,
Abrogation of the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 12 S.D.L. RaV. 364 (1967).
33 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 "(1966).
34 For a discussion of Briere and its probable effect on New Hampshire law, see 19 CAsn
W. REs. L. Rv. 139 (1967).
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should resolve issues according to the number of witnesses who appear for
the plaintiff or the defendant.35
Alaska considered the problem for the first time in 1967, in the case of
Hebel v. Hebel3 In refusing to apply the immunity doctrine, the Alaskan
Supreme Court stated that it felt the reasoning of Goller and Briere was more
convincing than any of the reasons developed in favor of the immunity.
7
The parent-child immunity doctrine was introduced into New York law in
1928 in the case of Sorrentino v. Sorrentino.8 The court's precise reasoning for
adopting it was not revealed, since the decision contained no opinion. From its
inception the doctrine met with opposition in New York. Sorrentino was a four
to three decision with the legal giants Cardozo, Crane and Andrews dissenting.
The lower New York courts accepted the rule only with reluctance and soon
began adopting the exceptions formulated in other jurisdictions.3 ' In 1939, the
New York Court of Appeals, in Rozell v. Rozell,4" refused to extend the immunity
doctrine to the brother-sister factual situation. A twelve year old boy was per-
mitted to recover against his sixteen year old sister for personal injuries he sus-
tained in an accident caused by her negligent driving. The family harmony
and public policy arguments were rejected for reasons that would seem to have
equal application to the parent-child situation." As could have been expected,
when the court of appeals, in the case of Cannon v. Cannon,42 faced the issue of
parent-child immunity for the second time, the plaintiff argued that Rozell
foreshadowed a change of policy leading away from the harsh result in
Sorrentino." However, bypassing an excellent opportunity to abrogate the rule,
the court distinguished Rozell and reiterated the family harmony argument, citing
only Sorrentino for support."" The immunity doctrine was not again considered
by the court of appeals until 1961, in Badigan v. Badigan." The court there
reaffirmed Sorrentino for the second time. Citing only Sorrentino and Cannon for
support, the majority concluded that it was a "settled New York rule that an
unemancipated minor child has no right of action against his parent for non-
willful injuries."" The opinion invoked a very strong dissent from Judge Fuld,
which in effect laid the foundation for the doctrine's abrogation some seven years
later.
Finally, in 1969, the court of appeals in the relatively brief opinion in
Gelbman, abolished completely the parent-child immunity doctrine in New York.
At the outset the court acknowledged that the immunity doctrine was the law in
that state.4 It then noted that the rule was created to prevent disruption of
35 107 N.H. at 434, 224 A.2d at 589-90 (1966).
36 425 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967).
37 Id. at 14.
38 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928).
39 For citations to many of these cases, see Comment, supra note 17.
40 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939).
41 See id. at 109-14, 22 N.E.2d at 255-58.
42 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 "(1942).
43 Id. at 427, 40 N.E.2d at 237.
44 Id. at 427-28.
45 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961).
46 Id. at 473, 174 N.E.2d at 719, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 36.




family unity, the very foundation of society. The court stated, however, that
such a rule could only be reaffirmed if it were in fact essential to the preservation
of family unity. 8 This was so, because, as the court later noted, "[a] rule
which so incongruously shields conceded wrongdoing bears a heavy burden of
justification ' .... "The conclusion was that this heavy burden was not met -
Sorrentino, Cannon and Badigan were expressly overruled."0
In reaching its decision, the Geibman court stated that it was merely sum-
marizing "the convincing arguments advanced by Judge Fuld in his compre-
hensive dissent in Badigan .... -11 Two different lines of reasoning were followed
in Gelbman. First, it was noted that the existence of the multitude of exceptions
to the rule could not be reconciled with the alleged purpose of the immunity -
the preservation of family harmony.52 For instance, one exception was that a
child could sue a parent on a contract or for matters involving property rights.
Why, as Judge Fuld had asked in Badigan, should a child be permitted to sue
for a broken contract, but not for a broken leg?53 Furthermore, the rule seemed
illogical in view of the fact that some of the most acrimonious family disputes
arise out of controversies over property rights. It was the Gelbman court's view
that these various exceptions did not support the rule but rather attested to its
primitive nature and required its repudiation. 4
Second, because of New York's compulsory automobile insurance laws, the
Gelbman court felt that the parent-child litigation, in fact if not in law, would
be between the plaintiff and the insurance company.5 5 Therefore, -permitting
suit would in no way impair family harmony. Pertinent to this issue is one of
Judge Fuld's "convincing arguments" which, while not cited in the GeIbman
opinion, probably influenced that court's decision:
The problem, in short, comes to this: A child is seriously injured by
his father's careless operation or maintenance of his automobile. As the
law now stands, the judgment recovered against the parent is more than
likely, in the vast majority of cases, to be paid by an insurer. If the crippled
child may have the benefit of this insurance, a fund will be supplied the
family to provide for him. If the fund is cut off, cripple as well as parent
will have to stagger beneath the load. To tell them that the pains must
be endured for the peace and welfare of the family is something of a
mockery. 6
Two arguments have often been raised against withdrawing the immunity
when insurance is present. The court recognized and answered both. First, pro-
48 Id. at 437, 245 N.E.2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
49 Id., quoting from Badigan v. Badigan, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 475, 174 N.E.2d 718, 721, 215
N.Y.S.2d 35, 38 (1961) (Fuld, dissenting).
50 Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531
(1969).
51 Id. at 437-38, 245 N.E.2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
52 Id. at 438, 245 N.E.2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
53 Badigan v. Badigan, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 476, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 39, 174 N.E.2d 718, 721
(1961).
54 Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d at 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531
(1969).
55 Id., 245 N.E.2d at 193-94.




ponents of the immunity doctrine contended that removing immunity when in-
surance is present would increase the danger of fraudulent and collusive suits.
The court's answer - the same it had used in Rozell - was that reliance must
be placed upon the ability of the jury to distinguish between valid and fraudulent
claims." The second argument, which seems to be the favorite of the majority
of the courts, is that the presence of insurance cannot create a liability where
none existed before. The Gelbman court, in answering, utilized the approach
originally formulated by Judge Peaslee in Dunlap. The gist of this position is
that the presence of insurance does not create a liability, but rather removes a
defense which was set up, for reasons of public policy, to an already existing
liability. 8 Since, with the presence of insurance, there is no danger of family
trouble, there is no reason for the defense to the liability.
The history of the parent-child immunity doctrine is a sad example of what
can result from a blind application of judicial precedent. The sole reason for
the creation of the immunity was to preserve family peace. Society's interest in
family unity was thought to be so great that it outweighed the child's right to
redress for civil wrongs. However, the courts soon began applying the immunity
without regard to whether the reasons for the rule were present. In time, this
blind application ironically produced the precise evil that the doctrine was cre-
ated to prevent.
New York, finally realizing the absurdity of applying the immunity doctrine
to cases involving insurance, has abolished it. However, the Gelbman court
went from one extreme to the other in abrogating the rule in its entirety. Ad-
mittedly, most parent-child suits probably do arise from automobile accidents.
Furthermore, compulsory insurance laws would emasculate the reasons for the
immunity in those situations. However, as few as they may be, there are situa-
tions in which a suit may arise that would not be covered by insurance and that
would cause animosity in the family. Under New York law, the immunity would
now be denied without regard to the suit's effect on family harmony.
Probably a more logical way of dealing with the immunity would have been
to recognize, as did Dunlap, that the immunity is in certain situations desirable,
but only when the reasons for its development are present - that is, when its
application will in fact prevent family discord. Thus, whether the immunity
would be permitted to be raised as a defense should depend upon the facts of
each individual case.
Richard F. Battagline
FEDERAL INCOME TAx - TAxPAYER'S DEDUCTIONS FOR ENTERTAINMENT
EXPENSES OF OVER $25 DISALLOWED BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBSTANTIATE
DIARY WITH CORROBORATING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE - TREASURY REGULA-
TION 1.274-5 (C) (2) HELD VALID.--Petitioner, William F. Sanford, was em-
ployed during 1963 as an outside salesman of television advertising time. As
57 Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532
(1969).
58 Id. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 370-72, 150 A. 905, 914-15 (1930).
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such, he was required to make presentations at luncheons and dinners in order
to procure buyers for his product. Part of his expenses incurred in this manner
were reimbursed by his employer. Sanford recorded in a diary the expenditures
for which he neither sought nor received reimbursement, but failed to obtain
any supporting receipt or other documentary evidence for these amounts as
required by Treasury Regulation 1.274-5(c) (2). On his federal income tax
return for that year he deducted $5,667.17 as nonreimbursed entertainment
expense. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction for all entertainment
expenditures of more than $25, which invalidated $4,984.31 of Sanford's de-
duction. Upon hearing Sanford's petition, the Tax Court affirmed the Com-
missioner's ruling and held: the Treasury Regulations promulgated under section
274(d) of the Internal Revenue Code specifying substantiation requirements
for deduction of entertainment expenses over $25 are valid, and petitioner failed
to substantiate his deductions in accordance with those regulations. Sanford v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823 (1968).
Prior to 1962, the major theory of calculating deductions for business
entertainment expenses was set forth in Judge Learned Hand's decision in
Cohan v. Commissioner.' In that case, George M. Cohan sought to deduct
substantial entertainment expenses for which he had no record. The Board of
Tax Appeals refused to allow a deduction for any part of the expenses because
the exact amount of the expenditures could not be determined.2 However, in
the court of appeals, Judge Hand took the view that a finding that some money
was spent necessitated an allowance of some deduction.' He felt that the Board
should approximate the expenses to ascertain the amount of the deduction,
"bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own
making."'4 Judge Hand's sole complaint was with the Board's decision to dis-
allow any deduction. Seemingly, if it had allowed some deduction, however
small, he would have found no fault.
The Cohan rule became one of the most widely used methods for deter-
mining deductions for business entertainment expenses.' However, "the absence
of any fixed standards of substantiation, as a practical matter (because of exces-
sive deductions), resulted in a shifting of the burden of proof from the taxpayer
to the government."' Furthermore, this lack of fixed standards created a tempta-
tion for many taxpayers, and a feeling arose that the right to take a deduction
for entertainment expenses was being abused.' Typically, a taxpayer would
keep no records and then claim more than he had actually spent in the hope that
eventually the Internal Revenue Service would allow him deductions in excess
1 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
2 Id. at 543.
3 Id. at 544.
4 Id.
5 Caplin, The Travel and Entertainment Expense Problem, 39 TAXEs 947, 959 (1961);
Emmanuel & Lipoff, Travel and Entertainment: The New World of Section 274, 18 TAX L.
REv. 487, 517 (1963).
6 Eichel, The Missouri Rule - Substantiation Requirements for Travel and Entertain-
ment Expenditures Under Section 274(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 18 U.




of his actual expenditures.' The courts, using various arguments, attempted to
control such alleged abuses.9 In Williams v. United States,"0 the Fifth Circuit,
in disallowing any deduction, held that the taxpayer must still introduce "suf-
ficient evidence to satisfy the trier that at least the amount allowed in the esti-
mate was in fact spent or incurred for the stated purpose."" The court heeded
Judge Hand's admonition that the rule should bear heavily on the taxpayer.
In some cases' 2 the Tax Court interpreted Cohan strictly and did not feel
obligated to apply the rule as long as the Commissioner had allowed some de-
duction. Other courts" allowed the Commissioner's approximation to stand in
the absence of sufficient proof that the taxpayer had indeed incurred a greater
expense. It might appear from these cases that the alleged abuses had been
overcome; however, while this might have been true in the courtroom applica-
tion of the rule, the Internal Revenue Service was still faced with the administra-
tive burden of applying it in the field. 4 With the Cohan rule hanging over them,
agents were forced to make compromises rather than burden an already over-
crowded court docket.'-
President Kennedy, in his tax message to Congress in 1961, expressed con-
cern over the abuses which were prevalent in the expense account area and
requested that all business entertainment expenses be disallowed as tax deduc-
tions." While Congress did not respond in full to the President's request, it
did pass section 4 of the Revenue Act of 1962, which became the present section
274 of the Internal Revenue Code,'" in an effort to curb abuses in the expense
account area. This section did not specifically overrule Cohan, but its legislative
history leaves no doubt that Cohan was superseded.'" In the words of Senator
Smathers, section 274(d) was passed to eliminate "one of the most flagrant abuses
of existing law; that is, the fraudulent practice of claiming deductions for more
expenses than were actually incurred and maintaining no records."' 9 Whether
this abuse did in fact exist is a much debated question.0 However, even the
possibility of abuse is unsatisfactory since a self-assessment tax system must
necessarily make all taxpayers feel that the burden is being shared equally.2'
8 Caplin, supra note 5, at 961.
9 Eichel, supra note 6, at 620.
10 245 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1957).
11 Id. at 560.
12 Harrison A. Bennet, 19 P-H TAx CT. MEm. 50,243, at 803 '(1950); Donald W.
Bolt, 16 P-H TAX CT. MEm. 47,329, at 1115 (1947).
13 E.g., Julian Cohen, 31 P-H TAX CT. MEM. % 62,051, at 326 (1962).
14 Since the decision of the Second Circuit in 1930, Cohan has been relied on in
an inestimable number of cases. In the last 12 months alone, over 30 reported
cases involve Cohan. This is on top of docketed cases settled before trial and
numerous controversies compromised at the administrative level. At informal field
audit conferences, Cohan is the most frequent issue. Caplin, supra note 5, at 959.
See also Eichel, supra note 6, at 617.
15 Axelrad, An Evaluation of the New Rules Relating to the Deductibility of Entertain-
ment, Travel, and Gifts: A Critical Look at Section 274, 16 U. So. CAL. 1964 TAX INST.
345, 387.
16 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1136-37 (1961).
17 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 274.
18 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3337 (1962).
19 108 CONG. REc. 18077 (1962). -
20 Compare Axelrad, supra note 15, at 386-87, with Eichel, supra note 6, at 617-18.
21 A tax system which relies upon each taxpayer to be his own tax assessor is
jeopardized when resentment is caused by discrimination which allows some tax-
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This need to overcome the distrust of the general taxpayer2 coupled with the
need to alleviate the administrative burden on the Internal Revenue Service23
gave rise to the passage of section 274.
Subsections (a) to (c) of section 274 place restrictions on the amount of
deductions allowable for entertainment, gifts and foreign travel. Subsection (d),
which is the basis of the Tax Court's holding in Sanford, outlines the substantia-
tion requirements that must be fulfilled before any deductions will be allowed.
Expenditures must be documented by "adequate records or by sufficient evidence
corroborating [the taxpayer's] own statement." '2 4 The items that must be sub-
stantiated are (a) the amount of the expense, (b) the time and place of the
expense, (c) the business purpose of the expense, and (d) the business relation-
ship of the person entertained.2 5 This subsection also provides that the Secretary
or his delegate may exclude expenses below a specified amount from the sub-
stantiation requirement. Subsection (h) allows the Secretary to promulgate
regulations which he may deem necessary to carry out the purposes of section 274.
Regulation 1.274-5, which attempts to implement section 274(d), was the
direct target of the taxpayer's attack in the present case. This regulation spe-
cifically supersedes the Cohan rule and sets out in detail the elements of ex-
penditure which require substantiation before deduction will be allowed. Basi-
cally, the elements enumerated are those contained in section 274(d) of the
Code, but there are slight variations depending upon whether the expenditure
was for travel, entertainment in general, gifts, or entertainment directly pre-
ceding or following a substantial and bona fide business discussion.
27
Subsection (c) of Regulation 1.274-5 delineates the method by which a
taxpayer must substantiate each of the required elements of amount, time and
place, business purpose and identity of recipient. The subsection envisions that
the taxpayer's substantiation must constitute "clear proof" of the expenditure.
To satisfy the "adequate records" method of substantiation the taxpayer must
fulfill two requirements. First, he must maintain an account book, diary, state-
ment of expense or similar record. This record must be made at or near the
time of the expenditure and specify the necessary elements. However, if the
element of business purpose is evident from the facts and circumstances, there is
no need to keep a written record of it.2" Second, the taxpayer must furnish
documentary evidence corroborating the entries in the diary. (This was the
requirement the Tax Court found lacking in Sanford.) This documentary
evidence in the form of receipts, paid bills or similar evidence is necessary only
for expenditures for lodging while traveling and for any other expenditure of
$25 or more. If the taxpayer fails to comply with the "adequate records" re-
quirement with respect to an element of an expenditure, then he must establish
payers to take unfair advantage of the laws. This discrimination makes taxpayers
resentful of the law which permits the situation to exist, and encourages them
toward laxity in discharging their full obligations. Eichel, supra note 6, at 618.
22 Id.
23 Axelrad, supra note 15, at 387.
24 INT. RyV. CODE oF 1954, § 274(d).
25 Id.
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(a)(3) (1962).
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(b) (1962).
28 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(c) (2) (ii) (b) (1962).
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the element (1) by his own statement in writing containing specific information,
in detail, as to such element, and (2) by other corroborative evidence sufficient
to establish such element." If the element to be established by this "other suf-
ficient evidence" test is the business relationship of the person entertained or the
business purpose, circumstantial evidence may be used. However, for the other
elements, direct evidence, such as testimony of persons entertained, or doc-
umentary evidence is required. The regulations also provide that if a taxpayer
can show that by reason of "exceptional circumstances" he was unable to obtain
evidence to satisfy the "adequate records" method or the "other sufficient evi-
dence" method, he may fulfill the requirement of substantiation by presenting
other evidence "which possesses the highest degree of probative value under the
circumstances.""0 Besides these Treasury regulations, the Internal Service pro-
mulgated a revenue procedure to ensure that taxpayers were fully apprised of
their responsibilities in this area."1
In the instant case, the Commissioner disallowed deductions for Sanford's
entertainment expenditures of $25 or more because of his failure to obtain
receipts for these expenditures. In the Tax Court, the Commissioner asserted
the additional argument that the expenses were not deductible under section
162 (a) of the Code, which requires that deductible expenditures must represent
ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business.
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner that the petitioner still had the
initial burden under section 162 (a) of proving that the expenses were ordinary
and necessary. While the court felt that Sanford had not fully satisfied this
burden with respect to some of the expenditures, it noted that this might have
been an appropriate case for the application of the Cohan rule had it not been
for the addition of section 274(d) to the Code.2
After discussing both the Code sections and the Treasury Regulations with
respect to substantiation, the Sanford court concluded that the petitioner had
not satisfied the "adequate records" requirement of 1.274-5(c) because of his
failure to obtain receipts or other documentary evidence. Furthermore, since
no direct evidence had been introduced to corroborate his diary, the petitioner
could not rely on the "other sufficient evidence" mode of substantiation. 3
The Tax Court then reasoned that Treasury Regulations 1.27 4 -5(c) (4) and
(5), which allow a taxpayer to substantiate by other evidence in exceptional
circumstances, were also inapplicable since receipts had been obtained for these
types of expenditures when reimbursement was sought from the employer.
3 4
The petitioner's main argument was that the regulations were invalid. 3
In upholding the regulations, the Tax Court maintained that the dollar limit in
connection with the substantiation requirement was a matter expressly left to
the Commissioner in section 274(d). It also reasoned that the requirement of
corroborative evidence in the regulation, while not expressly specified by the
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(c)(3) (1962).
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(c)(4) (1962).
31 Rev. Proc. 63-4, 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 474.
32 Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968).





language of the Code, was in accordance with the legislative intent to overcome
the abuse of exaggerating the true amount of expenses. 6 After reviewing the
pertinent legislative history, the court concluded:
[T]he committee reports are inconclusive in this respect, and we must con-
clude that in appropriate cases, involving larger expenditures, there was
no intention to preclude the Commissioner from demanding that diary
entries (self-serving statements) be supported by corroborating documentary
evidence.
3 7
Since this inconclusiveness was present and the regulations were not inconsistent
with the plain language of the Code, the Tax Court heeded the Supreme Court's
directive that "Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes .... "381
While it would not appear to be the usual case that a taxpayer would proceed
under the hope that a Treasury Regulation would be declared invalid, this decision
has now laid to rest, insofar as Tax Court litigation is concerned, any thoughts
which taxpayers may have entertained along that line in regard to the substantia-
tion regulations. While the court was correct in stating that the Code itself, in
light of its legislative history, did not require that documentary evidence in the
form of receipts be required, its further conclusion that "the regulations under
consideration reflect a faithful observance of the congressional intent ' 9 to curb
rather flagrant abuses cannot be faulted.
At least one commentator has felt that compelling taxpayers to fulfill the
"adequate records" requirement puts a burden of record keeping on the taxpayer
which he will not be able to maintain." However, the benefits to be gained by
this requirement more than outweigh any burden placed on the taxpayer. More-
over, the instant case shows that the burden is no greater than that which many
employers already require of their employees with respect to expense accounts.
Furthermore, if a taxpayer fails to carry his burden with respect to the "adequate
records," he can, at least theoretically, rely on the "other sufficient evidence"
mode of substantiation. 4 A strict adherence to these regulations will not only
provide a more uniform guideline under which treasury agents can better
ascertain the amount of allowable deductions, but will also instill taxpayers
who cannot avail themselves of the business entertainment deduction with a
greater feeling of confidence in the American tax system.
Paul E. Pollock
36 Id. at 831.
37 Id.
38 Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1947).
39 Sanford v. Comnissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 832 (1968).
40 Axelrad, supra note 15, at 387.
41 See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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